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CAN BANKS BE LIABLE 
FOR AIDING AND ABETTING TERRORISM?:  
A CLOSER LOOK INTO THE SPLIT 
ON SECONDARY LIABILITY 
UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM ACT 
Alison Bitterly* 
 
The Antiterrorism Act of 1990 (ATA) explicitly authorizes a private cause 
of action for U.S. nationals who suffer an injury “by reason of an act of 
international terrorism.”  ATA civil litigation has increased dramatically 
following September 11, 2001—and banks, because of their deep pockets, 
have emerged as an increasingly popular target.  Courts are divided 
concerning the scope of liability under the statute, specifically over whether 
the ATA authorizes a cause of action premised on secondary liability.  
Under a secondary liability theory, a plaintiff could argue that a bank, 
through providing financial services to a terrorist client, aided and abetted 
an act of international terrorism. 
This Note examines the conflict over secondary liability under the ATA, 
applies this conflict to banks specifically, and concludes that the legislative 
history of the ATA civil provision is not enough to support such a cause of 
action.  This Note ultimately finds, however, that the absence of any kind of 
secondary liability route for plaintiffs diminishes the ATA‟s power as a 
deterrent against terrorism financing and also has interesting 
repercussions for primary liability cases.  As a result, this Note argues that 
Congress should amend the ATA to explicitly permit secondary liability.  
However, in order to guard against excessive suits against innocent banks, 
courts should only permit claims premised upon secondary liability in 
extreme cases where the bank manifested intent or extreme recklessness in 
their dealings with terrorist clients. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Bank A handles millions of accounts worldwide.  It provides routine 
financial services to clients across six continents.  As a result of a bank 
employee‘s negligence, the bank transfers funds through a computerized 
system to a U.S.-designated terrorist group in the Middle East.  This money 
is used to procure a suicide vest, which a member of the group puts on and 
detonates in a street in Iraq.  One of the innocent bystanders killed is an 
American. 
Bank B does not possess the same level of business as Bank A.  Instead, it 
knowingly provides both routine and nonroutine services to a terrorist 
organization.  For instance, Bank B delivers personalized payments to the 
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families of suicide bombers after their deaths.  The terrorist group linked to 
the bank launches an attack abroad that kills an American. 
Bank C conducts business with many countries—including Iran, a 
country on the U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism list (―SST list‖).1  The 
extensive business with Iran is in violation of U.S. Office of Foreign Asset 
Control (OFAC) sanctions.2  Some of the funds the bank transfers to Iran 
are traced to the terrorist group Hezbollah.  The group launches an attack in 
Israel that kills an American citizen.3 
The civil provision of the Antiterrorism Act4 (ATA) expressly provides 
U.S. nationals with a private right of action for injury to person, property, or 
business, ―by reason of an act of international terrorism.‖5  In enacting the 
ATA, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), the government has enlisted private 
plaintiffs in the fight against terrorism, and § 2333(a) has become yet 
another weapon in the United States‘ counterterrorism arsenal.6 
Although it is clear that the ATA permits plaintiffs to name as defendants 
the terrorist organizations or persons directly responsible for committing an 
act fitting within the definition of international terrorism,7 U.S. federal 
courts are split over whether the ATA provides for suits under a secondary 
liability theory.8  As secondary liability often presents a different set of 
 
 1. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 2. See infra Part I.B.2 for further discussion on OFAC and its regulation of U.S. 
financial transactions involving foreign nations. 
 3. These hypothetical scenarios bear some resemblance to the three categories of 
Antiterrorist Act (ATA) banking cases addressed in 2 VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS,  
LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 9:42 (1986). 
 4. See Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, Title X, 
§ 1003(a)(4), 106 Stat. 4522 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331–2338 (1992)); 
Antiterrorism Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-519; 104 Stat. 2250 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2331–2338 (1990)).  The 1990 Act was removed for technical reasons and 
reinstated in 1992 with the same language. See infra note 50. 
 5. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012).  This Note will refer to 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) as the ATA 
civil provision, as the ATA private cause of action, or simply as § 2333(a).  The entirety of 
the ATA is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331–2338, which contains the civil and criminal 
provisions that this Note will collectively refer to as the ATA.  Title 18 U.S.C. § 2339A–D 
contains the material support provisions, which were added in later years, and are discussed 
as part of the ATA in this Note. See infra Part I.A.3.  This Note will collectively refer to the 
material support amendments as the ―material support law.‖ 
 6. See Brief of Petitioners-Appellants at 1, In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 
714 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 13-318) (―Both Congress and other federal courts have 
confirmed that the provision of the ATA at issue is essential to deterring and punishing the 
financing and material sponsorship of terrorism.‖); see also Debra Strauss, Enlisting the U.S. 
Courts in a New Front:  Dismantling the International Business Holdings of Terrorist 
Groups Through Federal Statutory and Common-Law Suits, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 
679, 739 (2005) (―The testimony supporting [the ATA] legislation placed much emphasis on 
the deterrent effect that these statutes would have on the commission of acts of international 
terrorism against U.S. citizens.‖). 
 7. See infra Part I.A.1 for greater consideration of this definition, which is codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 2331(1). 
 8. See Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 54 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting 
that at the time of the 2010 Wultz ruling ―circuits [were] split on the issue‖ of ATA 
secondary liability).  With regard to banks, this Note will typically refer to aiding and 
abetting liability (a form of secondary liability) and the more general concept of secondary 
liability interchangeably. 
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requirements than primary liability, the availability of secondary liability is 
of great importance to terrorism victim plaintiffs.9  In many cases, an aiding 
and abetting suit against a bank, based upon allegations that the bank 
provided financial services to a client terrorist group, may be a victim‘s best 
chance for relief where suing under a primary liability theory is not 
possible.10  In addition, as this Note discusses, the outcome of the 
secondary liability debate also could have powerful ramifications for the 
application of primary liability in banking cases. 
Under the varying standards applied across circuits today, ATA litigation 
against the above hypothetical banks could engender inconsistent results.11  
In understanding these disparate outcomes in ATA banking cases, it is 
helpful to consider banks as entities possessing ―mental states‖ across a 
spectrum—ranging from negligence, to knowledge, to recklessness, to 
intent—despite the fact that these are institutions rather than individuals.  
Courts are in conflict over what the requisite mental state should be for both 
secondary liability and primary liability.12 
In the case of Bank A—where the bank is merely negligent—it is likely 
(and arguably proper) that the bank will avoid liability; primary liability is 
not a viable option for plaintiffs, and success under a secondary liability 
theory is uncertain at best.13  Courts are much more likely to find Bank B 
liable under primary liability because, regardless of the requisite mental 
state for liability, Bank B arguably demonstrated intent to aid the terrorist 
group.  It is Bank C that illustrates the most ambiguous case.  In doing 
business with a state sponsor of terrorism, was the bank demonstrating 
intent to aid terrorists?  At what point should a bank know that its services 
are aiding a terrorist organization?  This Note considers these questions and 
examines where the scope of ATA liability for banks stands today. 
Although the ATA private cause of action has been in place for over 
twenty years, plaintiffs did not begin to take full advantage of its potential 
until its second decade of life.14  The September 11, 2001, attacks on the 
United States precipitated both a spike in terrorism-related lawsuits and the 
 
 9. See infra Part I.B. 
 10. Primary liability was the basis of a recent successful lawsuit and trial centered upon 
Arab Bank, PLC. See Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 04-cv-2799, 2014 WL 4913320 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2014) (verdict form); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 04-cv-2799 (BMC) 
(VVP), 2015 WL 1565479, at *27 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2015) (upholding the jury‘s verdict and 
discussing the nature of ATA liability).  In September 2014, a jury in Linde v. Arab Bank 
found Arab Bank liable for violating § 2333(a). Linde, 2014 WL 4913320.  The plaintiffs 
had advanced the theory that the bank was primarily liable for material support to terrorism 
and that violating this crime supported liability under the ATA civil provision. See Linde v. 
Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 578–79 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).  See infra Parts II and III 
for further discussion of the use of the material support law as a substitute for aiding and 
abetting liability. 
 11. See generally 2 NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 3. 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See Geoffrey Sant, So Banks Are Terrorists Now?:  The Misuse of the Civil Suit 
Provision of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 533, 534 (2013). 
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U.S. government‘s increased efforts to stanch the flow of funding to 
terrorism groups abroad.15 
The phrase ―terrorism financing‖ typically refers to the act of knowingly 
providing some resource to an individual or organization that takes part in 
terrorist activity.16  The U.S. government has estimated that plotting and 
executing the September 11 attacks required only between $400,000 and 
$500,000.17  Actual terrorist operations constituted a comparatively small 
portion of al Qaeda‘s budget at the time.18  The organization required 
funding for training, salaries for jihadists, and arms and vehicles before 
attacks could even be carried out.19  It is often difficult for governments to 
differentiate between funds used for attacks and funds used to support a 
terrorist group‘s social or political purposes.20  Furthermore, terrorist 
funding often comes from legitimate sources—such as charities and 
donors—as opposed to criminal activities.21 
An extensive and long-established fundraising network fueled al Qaeda‘s 
spread.22  Although al Qaeda as an organization likely did not use formal 
financial practices to transfer or store money after 1996, al Qaeda 
fundraisers continued to work within the means of traditional financial 
systems.23  It is likely that some of the banks linked to al Qaeda supporters 
were aware of their ties with terrorist organization fundraisers.24  The lack 
of financial regulation in Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 
particular contributed to al Qaeda‘s pre–September 11 financing success, 
and al Qaeda cells worldwide took advantage of susceptibilities within 
formal banking systems.25 
The United States began to take terrorism funding more seriously 
following the 1998 bombings on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and 
Tanzania.26  President Bill Clinton‘s National Security Council 
recommended that the United States issue sanctions against al Qaeda and 
Osama bin Laden under the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act27 (IEEPA), which authorized the President to levy sanctions against 
countries or entities that posed a national security threat to the United 
States.  Under the IEEPA, OFAC froze al Qaeda assets within the U.S. 
 
 15. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 16. See Terrorist Financing, U.S. ATTORNEY‘S BULL., July 2013, at 7. 
 17. See NAT‘L COMM‘N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION 
REPORT 169 (1st ed. 2004). 
 18. See id. at 171. 
 19. See id. 
 20. See Terrorist Financing, supra note 16, at 7. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See NAT‘L COMM‘N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., supra note 17, at 169–
70; see also JOHN ROTH ET AL., MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING 18 (2004). 
 23. See ROTH ET AL., supra note 22, at 25–26. 
 24. See id. at 26. 
 25. Id. (―[T]he September 11 hijackers and their co-conspirators had bank accounts and 
credit cards, made extensive use of ATM cards, and sent and received international wire and 
bank-to-bank transfers.‖). 
 26. See NAT‘L COMM‘N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., supra note 17, at 185. 
 27. Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1705 
(1977)). 
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financial system.28  After the United States formally designated al Qaeda a 
terrorist organization in October 1999, banks were legally required to seize 
the group‘s funds and block its transactions.29 
This Note explores private suits against banks for their alleged 
involvement in terrorist attacks overseas, with a particular focus on 
secondary liability.  Part I presents background on the ATA‘s language and 
legislative history, as well as a discussion of secondary liability in general 
and the ways in which courts have applied this form of liability in other 
areas of the law.  Part I also discusses the distinction between routine and 
nonroutine bank services and addresses several other aspects of banking 
regulation.  Part II delves into the conflict over whether secondary liability 
applies under the ATA‘s private cause of action and briefly addresses this 
issue‘s relevance to primary liability.  Part III argues that the absence of 
secondary liability under the ATA produces some intolerable consequences.  
As a result, Part III argues that Congress should amend the ATA to permit a 
secondary liability private cause of action in extreme cases where a bank 
manifests recklessness or intent—for example, by conducting extensive 
business with a U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism. 
I.   THE ANTITERRORISM ACT, SECONDARY LIABILITY, AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF TERRORISM SUITS AGAINST BANKS 
Part I.A focuses on the ATA itself, including the material support for 
terrorism crime that courts have sometimes incorporated into § 2333(a) via 
a theory of primary liability.30  Part I.B clarifies the important 
characteristics of these types of liability, as well as highlights how courts 
have handled similar secondary liability issues in private securities fraud 
suits and civil suits brought under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO).  Finally, Part I.C provides some background 
related to ATA banking cases in particular, focusing on the difference 
between routine and nonroutine banking services and the United States‘ 
implementation of lists to monitor terrorist individuals, groups, and 
sovereign states. 
A.   The Antiterrorism Act 
This section summarizes the ATA civil provision‘s language and 
legislative history.  This discussion is at the heart of the secondary liability 
issue and provides a necessary context for understanding how courts have 
responded to increased ATA litigation targeting banks.  This section also 
addresses the ATA‘s material support law, which plaintiffs have sometimes 
used as the basis for primary liability in banking cases. 
 
 28. See NAT‘L COMM‘N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., supra note 17, at 185. 
 29. See id. at 185 n.81 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2339B).  See infra Part I.C for an explanation 
of how OFAC utilizes lists to identify terrorist threats. 
 30. This Note, although focused on secondary liability, seeks to demonstrate that 
secondary and primary liability are closely intertwined in ATA banking cases. 
2015]  BANK LIABILITY UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM ACT 3395 
1.   The ATA‘s Statutory Language 
The ATA explicitly establishes a civil remedy for victims of international 
terrorism.31  Section 2333(a) states: 
Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or 
business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, 
survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of 
the United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she 
sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney‘s fees.32 
The statute expressly empowers U.S. nationals to file a claim.33  
However, the phrasing of ―by reason of an act of international terrorism‖ is 
somewhat ambiguous.34  For instance, some courts have held that this 
language requires the fulfillment of a proximate cause element.35 
Other areas of the ATA help illuminate the civil provision‘s language.  
Section 2331(1) defines ―international terrorism‖ as activities that: 
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a 
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or 
that would be a criminal violation if committed within the 
jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;  
(B) appear to be intended— 
(i)  to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;  
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or 
coercion; or  
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping; and 
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by 
which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to 
 
 31. See 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012). 
 32. Id.  See infra note 66 for a discussion of the phrase ―threefold the damages,‖ or 
treble damages. 
 33. Id.  Non-U.S. nationals have sought to use the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) as a means 
for civil redress for terrorism crimes, although following the Supreme Court‘s holding in 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., foreign plaintiffs must now demonstrate that their 
claims ―touch and concern‖ the United States to a degree that ―displace[s] the presumption 
against extraterritorial application‖ in order to sue under the ATS. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 
1669 (2013). 
 34. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). 
 35. See Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 95 (2d Cir. 2013) (relying on the reasoning 
of RICO cases to hold that the ―by reason of‖ language in § 2333(a) indicates a proximate 
cause requirement in primary liability claims); see also Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 
503 U.S. 258, 265–68 (1992) (finding that the ―by reason of‖ language in RICO‘s civil 
provision suggested that both ―but for‖ causation and proximate causation were required 
elements); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 560, 
569 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (―‗By reason of‘ has been interpreted by courts to require something 
more than ‗but for‘ causation.‖); infra Part I.B.2.a–b (discussing RICO and the Rothstein 
ruling, respectively). 
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intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate 
or seek asylum . . . .36 
This provision defines international terrorism in terms of ―acts‖ that 
―involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life‖ that are in violation 
of U.S. criminal law, or would be if committed within U.S. jurisdiction.37  
Individuals must also commit these acts with the intent to coerce or 
intimidate civilians or a government, or affect government conduct.38  
Finally, the act must occur primarily outside of the United States or 
―transcend national boundaries.‖39 
In addition, the ATA civil provision does not identify whom a private 
individual may sue—the language is open-ended.40  The definition of 
terrorism in § 2331(1) also does not describe the terrorism actor, instead it 
focuses on the nature of the acts.41  As a result, victims of terrorist attacks 
abroad have attempted to use this provision to hold banks, corporations, and 
countries liable for terrorist acts.42  Such cases have succeeded on some 
occasions, particularly when the defendant was a state sponsor of 
terrorism.43  Section 2333(a)‘s ambiguous language has consequently 
opened the door for plaintiffs to sue also under the theory that banks are 
secondarily liable for acts of international terrorism.44 
2.   The ATA‘s Legislative History 
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to ―define and punish 
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the 
 
 36. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1).  This definition is the same as the definition for international 
terrorism provided in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 
92 Stat. 1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801); see also Nick Harper, FISA‟s Fuzzy Line 
Between Domestic and International Terrorism, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1123, 1138 (2014) (―The 
ATA essentially adopted FISA‘s definition of international terrorism.‖); Nicholas J. Perry, 
The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of Terrorism:  The Problem of Too Many Grails, 
30 J. LEGIS. 249, 256 (2004) (―The definition of ‗international terrorism‘ . . . is a verbatim 
copy of the FISA definition . . . .‖). 
 37. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A). 
 38. Id. § 2331(1)(B). 
 39. Id. § 2331(1)(C).  For instance, the Southern District of New York has held that the 
September 11 attacks, while occurring on U.S. soil, nonetheless qualify as acts of 
international terrorism because the attacks transcended national boundaries in their 
magnitude and impact. See Nina J. Crimm, High Alert:  The Government‟s War on the 
Financing of Terrorism and Its Implications for Donors, Domestic Charitable 
Organizations, and Global Philanthropy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341, 1435–36 (2004) 
(citing Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 262 F. Supp. 2d 217, 221–22 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003)). 
 40. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). 
 41. See id. § 2331(1). 
 42. See infra Part II. 
 43. See Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 864 F. Supp. 2d 24, 32–37 (D.D.C. 2012) 
(holding Syria and Iran liable under the ATA). 
 44. See infra Part II.B. 
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Law of Nations.‖45  This clause, known sometimes as the Define and 
Punish Clause, has served as a basis for antiterrorism legislation.46 
The ATA was first enacted in 1987.47  At that point, the legislation was 
predominantly focused on the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).48  
The act designated the PLO as a terrorist organization and instituted certain 
restrictions on transactions and dealings with the group.49  In 1990, 
Congress enacted a second version of the ATA that created several new 
provisions, including the ATA‘s civil provision and the detailed definition 
of international terrorism that remains part of the ATA today.50  Congress 
continued to pass further antiterrorism legislation over the years, 
particularly following the September 11 attacks.51 
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic52 was the first case in which a court 
considered civil liability for terrorist acts and likely helped spark the 
movement toward a private cause of action for victims of international 
terrorism.53  In this case, the plaintiffs sued the Libyan government, the 
PLO, and PLO-linked nongovernmental organizations under the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS).54  The ATS had recently emerged as a tool for providing 
redress to victims of crimes in violation of international norms.55  However, 
on appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the lower court‘s dismissal of the case, 
 
 45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 46. See Patrick L. Donnelly, Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction over Acts of Terrorism 
Committed Abroad:  Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 72 
CORNELL L. REV. 599, 608–09 (1987) (describing the congressional powers authorized under 
the Define and Punish Clause). 
 47. Antiterrorism Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-204, §§ 1001–1005, 101 Stat. 1406 
(codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201–5203 (1987)); see also Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. 
Supp. 2d 257, 266 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussing the evolution of the ATA‘s civil provision). 
 48. 22 U.S.C. § 5202. 
 49. For instance, it is unlawful to receive ―anything of value‖ (excluding informational 
material) from the PLO, expend funds from the PLO, or establish facilities on behalf of the 
PLO. Id. 
 50. See supra note 35.  In 1991, Congress repealed the ATA due to a technical issue. See 
Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. Supp. 2d 410, 414 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).  However, in 1992, 
Congress reenacted all of the 1990 Act‘s substantive provisions in the Federal Courts 
Administration Act of 1992. See id.; Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 266 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 51. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 
115 Stat. 272 (2001); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).  See infra Part I.A.3 for a discussion of the material support 
law, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339–2339(d). 
 52. 517 F. Supp. 542, 549–51 (D.D.C. 1981), aff‟d, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per 
curiam).  The case arose from a Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) attack in 1978 in 
Haifa, Israel. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 776.  The PLO took 121 civilian hostages, and before the 
Israeli police were able to resolve the crisis, twelve children and twenty-two adults had been 
killed, with eighty-seven injured. Id. 
 53. See Beth Van Schaack, Finding the Tort of Terrorism in International Law, 28 REV. 
LITIG. 381, 285, 388 (2008). 
 54. Id. at 385–86. 
 55. Id. at 385.  The ATS provides that ―district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.‖ 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
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holding that under the ATS there was no private cause of action for victims 
of international terrorism.56 
Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro57 also sheds light on the genesis of 
the ATA‘s private cause of action.  In 1985, members of the PLO 
commandeered the Achille Lauro, an Italian cruise ship, on its journey 
through the eastern Mediterranean Sea.58  The perpetrators murdered Leon 
Klinghoffer, a U.S. citizen, during the attack.59  The Klinghoffer family was 
able to bring its claims against the PLO in U.S. federal court only because 
the crime took place in international waters and therefore was subject to 
federal admiralty jurisdiction.60  If the terrorist act had occurred on land, it 
is unlikely that any court would have upheld jurisdiction in the wake of Tel-
Oren.61  Congressional records from 1991 indicate that Klinghoffer was 
instrumental in spurring Congress‘s enactment of a private cause of action 
for terrorism cases.62  In enacting the ATA, Congress sought to provide a 
more reliable form of relief for U.S. victims of international terrorism.63 
Courts have also scrutinized the legislative history of the ATA in order to 
better understand § 2333(a)‘s language.64  In a 1991 statement before the 
Senate, Senator Charles Grassley, one of the ATA‘s sponsors, noted that the 
statute enabled plaintiffs to circumvent ―jurisdictional hurdles‖ and 
―empower[ed] victims with all the weapons available in civil litigation.‖65  
He also stated that the ATA ―accords victims of terrorism the remedies of 
 
 56. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 798; see also Thomas H. Lee, The Three Lives of the Alien 
Tort Statute:  The Evolving Role of the Judiciary in U.S. Foreign Relations, 89 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1645, 1647 (2014); Van Schaack, supra note 53, at 386. 
 57. 739 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), vacated by 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 58. Id. at 856. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 858–59. 
 61. See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim I), 291 F.3d 1000, 1010 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(citing Klinghoffer, 739 F. Supp. at 858–59) (―The district court found that [Klinghoffer‘s] 
survivors‘ claims were cognizable in federal court under federal admiralty jurisdiction and 
the Death on the High Seas Act because the tort occurred in navigable waters.‖); see also 
Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, 242 F.R.D. 199, 214 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).  For purposes of clarity, 
this Note will refer to the Seventh Circuit‘s decision in 2002, which held that there is a 
secondary liability cause of action under § 2333(a), as Boim I, and the Seventh Circuit‘s en 
banc decision in 2008 (overturning Boim I and holding against permitting secondary 
liability) as Boim III. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev. (Boim III), 549 F.3d 
685, 705 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 62. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-1040, at 5 (1992) (―The recent case of the Klinghoffer family 
is an example of this gap in our efforts to develop a comprehensive legal response to 
international terrorism.‖). 
 63. See Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. Supp. 2d 410, 421 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); see also H.R. 
REP. NO. 102-1040, at 5 (―Only by virtue of the fact that the [Klinghoffer] attack violated 
certain Admiralty laws and that the organization involved—the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization—had assets and carried on activities in New York, was the court able to 
establish jurisdiction over the case.  A similar attack occurring on an airplane or in some 
other locale might not have been subject to civil action in the U.S.  In order to facilitate civil 
actions against such terrorists the Committee [on the Judiciary] recommend[ed] [this bill].‖). 
 64. See, e.g., Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1010; Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 
2d 1, 55–57 (D.D.C. 2010).   
 65. See 137 CONG. REC. 4511 (1991).  Senator Grassley cited banking information and 
subpoenas for financial records as examples of such tools. Id. 
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American tort law, including treble damages and attorney‘s fees.‖66  
Previously, Senator Grassley had stated that, with the ATA, ―terrorists will 
be held accountable where it hurts them most: at their lifeline, their 
funds.‖67 
In a hearing before the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative 
Practice of the Committee on the Judiciary, Professor Wendy Perdue 
advocated for the inclusion of a civil remedy that not only held liable 
terrorist organizations, but also ―the organizations, businesses and nations‖ 
that aided these organizations and likely had reachable assets.68  However, 
Perdue acknowledged that § 2333(a) would likely lead to confusion 
regarding the subject of secondary liability.69  Senator Grassley brought 
these concerns to the attention of Joseph A. Morris, then–General Counsel 
of the Information Agency, who also testified at the ATA Senate hearings.70  
Morris responded that ―as drafted [the ATA] is powerfully broad‖ and that 
it was intended to ―bring [in] all of the substantive law of the American tort 
law system.‖71  Morris added that traditional tort law had a principle similar 
to criminal law‘s doctrine of aiding and abetting; he claimed that this 
principle would therefore apply to the ATA civil provision and suggested 
that the provision could be used against negligent defendants.72 
Finally, a July 1992 post-enactment Senate Committee Report discussed 
the purpose of the ATA, noting that in providing for compensatory and 
treble damages and ―impos[ing] . . . liability at any point along the causal 
chain of terrorism,‖ the ATA ―would interrupt, or at least imperil, the flow 
of money‖ to terrorist organizations.73 
 
 66. See id.; see also Goodrow v. Lane Bryant, Inc., 732 N.E.2d 289, 299 (Mass. 2000) 
(discussing treble damages‘ punitive nature).  Courts differ on the statutory predicate 
required for treble damages. See, e.g., Bangert v. Harris, 553 F. Supp. 235, 239 (M.D. Pa. 
1982) (holding that specific statutory authorization was needed for a court to award treble 
damages). 
 67. 136 CONG. REC. 14279–84 (1990). 
 68. See Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 14, 
Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002) (Nos. 01-1969, 01-1970) [hereinafter Boim I Brief] 
(citing Antiterrorism Act of 1990:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. 
Practice, 101st Cong. 136 (1990) (statement of Professor Wendy Perdue)). 
 69. 136 CONG. REC. 14279–84. 
 70. Boim I Brief, supra note 68, at 13–14. 
 71. See Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 56 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing 
Antiterrorism Act of 1990:  Hearing before the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative 
Practice, 101st Cong. 136 (1990) (statement of Joseph A. Morris, General Counsel, U.S. 
Information Agency)); see also Boim I Brief, supra note 68, at 14. 
 72. See Boim I Brief, supra note 68, at 14 (quoting Morris as stating that ―[t]he tort law 
system has similar rules [to criminal law‘s vicarious liability] where liability attaches to 
those who knowingly or negligently‖ aid another actor in severely injuring another, and that 
―as [the ATA civil provision] is drafted, it brings all of that tort law potential into any of 
these civil suits‖). 
 73. S. REP. NO. 102-342, at 22 (1992).  In January 2013, Congress amended the ATA‘s 
statute of limitations provision, extending the time period from four years to ten years. See 
18 U.S.C. § 2335 (1992); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. 
No. 112-239, 126 Stat. 1632; see also Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 950 F. Supp. 2d 459, 460 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that courts must apply the amended ten-year statute of limitations 
retroactively to cases that were pending during or commenced following the amendment 
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Currently, there is a potentially game-changing bill before Congress 
called the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act74 (JASTA).  If passed 
in its current form, the bill would explicitly permit a private ATA cause of 
action predicated upon a theory of secondary liability.75  The bill would 
amend § 2333 by adding the following:  ―In an action arising under 
subsection (a), liability may be asserted as to the person or persons who 
committed such act of international terrorism or any person or entity that 
aided, abetted, or conspired with the person or persons who committed such 
an act of international terrorism.‖76 
However, the bill is not entirely focused on the secondary liability 
issue—a significant portion of the text revolves around stripping sovereign 
immunity from countries that engage in acts of terrorism, regardless of 
whether they are considered a state sponsor of terrorism.77  JASTA passed 
the Senate in December 2014 and in January 2015 was referred to the 
House Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice.78 
3.   The Crime of Material Support to Terrorism 
In its current form, the material support law is the product of multiple 
attempts to cut off the flow of money and resources to international terrorist 
organizations.79  The material support law was first codified in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339A in reaction to the 1993 World Trade Center bombings.80  At the 
time, the law did not criminalize material support to terrorist groups where 
the funding party did not specifically intend the groups to use the support 
for terrorist attacks or operations.81 
 
date); Abecassis v. Wyatt, No. H-09-3884, 2013 WL 5231543, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 
2013). 
 74. See H.R. 3143, 113th Cong. (2013), available at https://www.congress.gov/ 
bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3143/all-actions. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See id.  The passage of JASTA would consequently permit plaintiffs to go after 
countries such as Saudi Arabia, which is not on the SST list but has faced accusations of 
funding the September 11 attacks. Id. 
 78. See id.; see also S. 1535, 113th Cong. (2013), available at https://www.congress. 
gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/1535/actions. 
 79. See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario:  Terrorism-Support Laws and the 
Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 4 (2005) (―The material support law is one 
part of a matrix of terrorism-support laws that have accrued over many years through the 
painstaking efforts of individuals in the executive and legislative branches intent on putting a 
stop to the phenomenon of U.S. persons providing support, well-intentioned or otherwise, to 
foreign terrorist organizations.‖). 
 80. Id. at 12; see also Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (1994)).  The law was since 
amended to define ―material support or resources‖ as including the provision of services and 
items falling into four categories:  (1) funding; (2) tangible equipment; (3) logistical support; 
and (4) personnel. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339(A)(b) (2012); see also Chesney, supra note 79, at 
12 n.69. 
 81. See Chesney, supra note 79, at 13.  Under this original version of the material 
support law, an individual could donate to a terrorist group as such as Hezbollah, for 
example, as long as she believed that the money would only be used for the group‘s social or 
political activities. Id. 
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To expand the reach of the law, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.82  
The new law, while applying only to those providing material support to 
groups designated as terrorist organizations by the U.S. Secretary of State, 
does not require specific intent to aid acts of terrorism.83  The U.S. Supreme 
Court affirmed this interpretation of § 2339B in Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project.84 
Section 2339B also contains a civil liability provision.85  However, this 
provision does not extend to private plaintiffs—only the government can 
bring an action for civil fines in addition to criminal liability.86  Therefore, 
any chance of relief for private plaintiffs who were victims of terrorist 
attacks lies solely in § 2333(a).87 
Civil remedies for criminal acts can serve as a useful deterrent to criminal 
activity.88  In addition, some courts have suggested using the material 
support law as the base crime in suits against entities that allegedly 
provided money or other resources to terrorist organizations.89  The 
Supreme Court in Holder confirmed that § 2339B did not require that the 
defendant specifically intend to further terrorist activities—it was sufficient 
for a party to know that the group in question was a terrorist group.90  As 
Part III discusses, this aspect of Holder is in tension with the ATA‘s 
definition of international terrorism.91 
B.   Secondary Versus Primary Liability, and Why the Difference Matters 
This section explains how courts have applied—or chosen not to apply—
secondary liability in different areas of the law.92  This section also briefly 
addresses the ways in which victims of terrorism can harness the material 
 
 82. Id. at 15–18.  However, Chesney notes that the law is narrower in the sense that 
§ 2339A can apply to aid given to anyone, while § 2339B is specific to aid given to terrorist 
groups. Id. at 18. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (1996) (criminalizing knowingly providing 
material support to a U.S.-designated terrorist organization and foregoing a specific intent 
requirement), with 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (1994) (permitting charges where the group is not a 
U.S.-designated terrorist organization). 
 83. See Chesney, supra note 79, at 18. 
 84. 561 U.S. 1, 8 (2010); see also infra Part II.B.1. 
 85. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(b). 
 86. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41334, TERRORIST MATERIAL SUPPORT:  
A SKETCH OF 18 U.S.C. 2339A AND 2339B, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 5 (2010). 
 87. See id. 
 88. See Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 489 (D.C.C. 1983). 
 89. See Boim III, 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008).  See infra Part II.B.1 for further 
discussion of Judge Richard Posner‘s ―chain or incorporations‖ approach to holding 
organizations secondarily liable under the ATA. 
 90. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 17–18 (2010).  Defendants have 
often challenged this absence of a specific intent requirement as unconstitutional. See 
generally id.; United States v. Al Kassar, 582 F. Supp. 2d 488, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(―Defendants contend that because Section 2339B does not require a showing of specific 
intent to further the illegal activities of a foreign terrorist organization, it violates the due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment.‖). 
 91. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 92. In particular, the ruling in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of 
Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994), which concerned secondary liability in private securities fraud 
suits, has strongly influenced ATA banking cases. See infra Part I.B.2.a. 
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support provision in primary liability causes of action.  As Part II 
demonstrates, courts have invoked the following theories frequently in 
discussing whether or not banks should be held secondarily liable under the 
ATA civil provision. 
1.   The Nature of Secondary Liability 
It is crucial to consider the differences between secondary and primary 
liability in both civil and criminal law.  Many states have accepted the 
definition of secondary civil liability articulated in the Second Restatement 
of Torts, although this acceptance is by no means unanimous.93  According 
to the Restatement, an individual may be secondarily liable for a tort when 
that individual (a) commits a tortious act ―in concert‖ with a principal, 
(b) knows that the principal‘s conduct is tortious and gives substantial 
assistance or encouragement to the principal, or (c) gives such ―substantial 
assistance‖ to the principal and separately breaches a duty to the third 
person.94 
This Note is primarily concerned with subsection (b) of the 
Restatement‘s definition, which serves as the civil equivalent of aiding and 
abetting liability.95  The Restatement establishes a three-pronged test for 
aiding and abetting liability:  (1) the principal committed tortious conduct; 
(2) the aider had knowledge of the principal‘s conduct; and (3) the aider 
gave substantial assistance or encouragement to the principal.96  However, 
the Restatement does not explicitly mention any mental state requirement.97 
There is no single universal test for civil aiding and abetting liability.98  
Nevertheless, in 1983, the D.C. Circuit in Halberstam v. Welch99 provided 
some clarity.  The Supreme Court would later describe Halberstam as a 
―comprehensive opinion on the subject‖ of civil aiding and abetting 
 
 93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979); see also Will Rice, 
American & British Insurers and Courts As Aiders and Abettors of Commercial Terrorism, 6 
ST. MARY‘S L. REV. ON MINORITY ISSUES 1, 44–47 (2003).  In specific relation to aiding and 
abetting civil liability, Rice noted that ―[a]lthough many jurisdictions have recognized civil 
liability for aiding and abetting in some circumstances where there is proof of ‗substantial 
assistance,‘ not all have formally adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b).‖ Id. at 44 
n.190. 
 94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876. 
 95. See Nathan Isaac Combs, Note, Civil Aiding and Abetting Liability, 58 VAND. L. 
REV. 241, 254–55 (2005). 
 96. See Kevin Bennardo, The Tort of Aiding and Advising?:  The Attorney Exception to 
Aiding and Abetting a Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 84 N.D. L. REV. 85, 85 (2008) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b)); see also In re Chiquita Brand Int‘l, Inc. Alien 
Tort Statute & S‘holder Derivative Litig., Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2010) 
(citing Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983), and applying the test to the 
ATA civil provision). 
 97. See Combs, supra note 95, at 289–90. 
 98. See id. at 278 (―With the dearth of coherent precedent and the increasing importance 
of civil aiding and abetting, courts need a clearer test for liability.‖). 
 99. 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
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liability.100  In Halberstam, the court relied on the Restatement‘s view 
when upholding civil aiding and abetting liability and conspiracy liability in 
a case where a woman had both knowingly and substantially assisted in a 
murder.101  The woman had acted as a banker, bookkeeper, and secretary 
for the murderer with the knowledge that her activities helped him in the 
commission of illegal acts.102  The court did not require that the prosecution 
demonstrate that the defendant specifically intended the principal to commit 
murder.103 
On the other hand, criminal secondary liability, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2, 
is more clear-cut.104  This statute provides that ―whoever commits an 
offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, 
induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.‖105  An 
aider must manifest specific intent to be liable for aiding and abetting a 
crime; this differs from criminal conspiracy liability (another form of 
secondary liability), and of course civil aiding and abetting liability.106  
Criminal aiding and abetting also does not require a completed crime, 
whereas civil aiding and abetting requires the actual commission of a 
tort.107  However, as the next section demonstrates, courts have interpreted 
the Supreme Court‘s ruling in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate 
Bank of Denver108 as barring the application of § 2(a) to private causes of 
action.109 
2.   Statutory Secondary Liability Analogies:  Securities Fraud and RICO 
This section considers two statutory analogies that courts have commonly 
invoked in evaluating the viability of secondary liability suits against banks 
under the ATA. 
 
 100. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 181 (1994).  
See infra Part I.B.2.a for an in-depth discussion of this case‘s handling of secondary liability 
under federal securities law. 
 101. Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 487–89. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 488. 
 104. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 105. Id. § 2(a).  Title 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) also provides that ―whoever willfully causes an act 
to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the 
United States, is punishable as a principal.‖ 
 106. See Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949); United States v. 
Turner, 583 F.3d 1062, 1067 (8th Cir. 2009). Conspiracy to provide material support to 
terrorism occurs when a party agrees to provide such support; it is an inchoate crime, 
meaning that mere planning is sufficient and the actual completion of an act is unnecessary 
for liability. See DOYLE, supra note 86, at 2.  Furthermore, conspirators may be held liable 
for the original scheme as well as any foreseeable consequences carried out in the 
commission of the scheme. Id. This Note, however, focuses on aiding and abetting liability 
as opposed to conspiracy. 
 107. See Combs, supra note 95, at 280. 
 108. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 109. See, e.g., Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644, 656 (3d Cir. 
1998) (citing Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 181–82 
(1994)). 
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a.   Central Bank and Secondary Liability in Securities Fraud Cases 
In 1994, the Supreme Court held in Central Bank that section 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934110 did not provide for secondary 
liability claims in private securities fraud suits.111  As a result, the plaintiffs 
were unable to sue on the theory that the defendant, the Central Bank of 
Denver, had aided and abetted the other defendants in committing securities 
fraud.112 
The plaintiffs, the First Interstate Bank of Denver and Jack K. Naber, had 
purchased $2.1 million in bonds from the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills 
Public Building Authority.113  The Central Bank of Denver served as the 
indenture trustee for the bonds at issue, and the public building authority 
defaulted soon afterward.114  Before the default, the bank discovered that 
the land used to secure the bonds was possibly insufficient, thereby 
necessitating a new appraisal on the bonds.115  However, no such appraisal 
ever took place.116 
The District of Colorado granted the Central Bank of Denver‘s motion 
for summary judgment; however, the Tenth Circuit reversed the decision on 
the basis that the circuit had previously permitted private aiding and 
abetting actions under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.117  It is 
illegal to ―directly or indirectly‖ engage in conduct meeting the elements of 
securities fraud under section 10(b), as well as Securities Exchange 
Commission Rule 10b-5.118  Other federal courts had also permitted private 
 
 110. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881.   
 111. See generally Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. 164. 
 112. Id. at 191. 
 113. Id. at 167–68. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 167. 
 116. Id. at 167–68. 
 117. Id. at 166–168.  Section 10(b) is the general antifraud provision of the 1934 Act. Id. 
at 171.  The Tenth Circuit rule permitted a section 10(b) aiding and abetting cause of action 
consisting of the following elements:  ―(1) a primary violation of § 10(b); (2) recklessness by 
the aider and abettor as to the existence of the primary violation; and (3) substantial 
assistance given to the primary violator by the aider and abettor.‖ Id. at 168.  The 1934 Act 
generally regulates post-distribution trading, while its predecessor, the Securities Act of 
1933, regulates the initial distribution of securities. Id. at 171 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 752 (1975)); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881; Securities Exchange Act of 1933, Title I, Pub. L. No. 73-
22, 48 Stat. 74. 
 118. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange . . .To use or employ, in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security 
not so registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe. 
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).  Rule 10b-5 contains similar language and also lacks an explicit 
private right of action. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014). 
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aiding and abetting claims under section 10(b).119  These interpretations 
relied upon the argument that Congress had enacted the 1934 Act to meet 
broad policy objectives, and that permitting private secondary liability 
actions would be in line with such objectives.120  The tide began to turn in 
the years before the Supreme Court‘s Central Bank holding, as some 
federal appellate courts began to question other circuits‘ earlier rulings in 
favor of secondary liability.121 
In its Central Bank decision, the Supreme Court sought to resolve the 
split among the circuits respecting a private cause of action for secondary 
liability under section 10(b).122  The Supreme Court itself had previously 
inferred a private right of action in securities fraud cases.123  However, 
Congress never advised courts on how far to extend private liability.124  
Therefore, in Central Bank the Court was extremely hesitant to infer a 
private right of action based on secondary liability without clear statutory 
language establishing any private right in the first place.125  Writing for the 
Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy held that Congress did not intend to create 
an aiding and abetting private cause of action under section 10(b).126 
The plaintiffs in Central Bank used the ―directly or indirectly‖ language 
of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to assert that the statutory text supported 
secondary liability.127  The Court found this argument unpersuasive.128  The 
Court also looked to those sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts that did 
expressly provide for a private right of action to further support its 
 
 119. See, e.g., Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983); Kerbs v. Fall 
River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 740 (10th Cir. 1974); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life 
Ins. Co, 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), aff‟d, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969). 
 120. See, e.g., SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1311 n.12 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 121. See, e.g., Akin v. Q-L Invs., Inc. 959 F.2d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting the 
―powerful argument‖ that ―aider and abettor liability should not be enforceable by private 
parties pursuing an implied right of action‖); Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 
797 F.2d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1986) (effectively eliminating secondary liability in securities 
cases through its holding that a deceptive or manipulative act was required for section 10(b) 
liability). 
 122. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 170 (1994). 
 123. See Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 
(1971) (finding an implied private right of action under section 10(b)). 
 124. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 173 (―Congress did not create a private § 10(b) cause of 
action and had no occasion to provide guidance about the elements of a private liability 
scheme.‖). 
 125. Id. 
 126. See id. at 177. 
 127. Id. at 175–76. 
 128. Id. at 176.  The court noted that there was ―a basic flaw with this interpretation.‖ Id.  
For example, permitting an aiding and abetting action extends the statute to persons who do 
not engage in fraud or deception at all, ―but who give a degree of aid to those who do.‖ Id.  
Such an interpretation would also do away with the established reliance element of Rule 
10b-5. Id. at 180 (―Our reasoning is confirmed by the fact that respondents‘ argument would 
impose 10b–5 aiding and abetting liability when at least one element critical for recovery 
under 10b–5 is absent:  reliance.‖ (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988))).  
The Court concluded that ―the text of the 1934 Act does not itself reach those who aid and 
abet a § 10(b) violation.  Unlike those courts [recognizing an aiding and abetting action], 
however, we think that conclusion resolves the case.‖ Id. at 177. 
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conclusion.129  Finding that these sections failed to address aiding and 
abetting liability, the Court concluded that Congress had not intended 
aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b).130 
Finally, the Court rejected the plaintiffs‘ argument that the Acts‘ 
legislative history supported an aiding and abetting private cause of action, 
finding that neither section 10(b)‘s text nor history implied that aiding and 
abetting was included in the Act.131  The plaintiffs argued that Congress 
had intended to imbue the 1933 and 1934 Acts with general tort law 
principles and asserted that aiding and abetting liability was ―well 
established in both civil and criminal actions by 1934.‖132  After analyzing 
aiding and abetting liability under both tort and criminal law theory, the 
Court dispatched this argument as well.133  The Court, in the end, found that 
there was no general presumption in favor of aiding and abetting liability 
and that the plaintiffs had not provided sufficient evidence of congressional 
intent to rebut this presumption.134 
As Part II discusses in detail, since Central Bank many courts have 
analogized private securities fraud suits to private suits under the ATA civil 
provision.135  Part II demonstrates how Central Bank has served as the 
cornerstone for arguments against holding banks secondarily liable under 
the ATA, while proponents of secondary liability have instead attempted to 
distinguish section 10(b) from § 2333(a).136 
b.   RICO and Secondary Liability 
In 1970, Congress enacted RICO via the Organized Crime Control 
Act.137  The statute provides for both criminal and civil penalties on entities 
or individuals engaged in racketeering activity, which the law broadly 
defines to include many kinds of criminal activity.138  At the time, the law 
primarily targeted organized crime throughout the United States.139  RICO 
makes illegal many kinds of racketeering activity performed ―directly or 
indirectly,‖ including, under certain circumstances, investing income 
derived from racketeering or participating in the conducting of an 
 
 129. Id. at 178. 
 130. Id. at 179. 
 131. Id. at 183–84. 
 132. Id. at 180–81 (citing Brief for SEC As Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner-
Appellants at 10, Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (No. 92-854)). 
 133. Id. 181–83. 
 134. Id. at 182. 
 135. See infra Part II.B. 
 136. See infra Part II. 
 137. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961–1968 (1970)). 
 138. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1961, ―racketeering activity‖ includes crimes such as ―any act or 
threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in 
obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance or listed chemical . . . which is 
chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year‖ as well 
as an extensive list of other crimes under Title 18 of the U.S. Code. 
 139. See 2 OTTO G. OBERMAIER & ROBERT G. MORVILLO, WHITE COLLAR CRIME:  
BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES § 11.03, at 11-6 (2006). 
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enterprise‘s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.140  The RICO 
civil provision states that ―[a]ny person injured in his business or property 
by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in 
any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the 
damages he sustains and the cost of the suit.‖141 
Although prosecutors did not initially harness the full potential of RICO, 
today the law is used against various types of crime and not necessarily 
organized crime.142  The initial targeting of mob crime has been expanded 
to include white collar crime and terrorism.143  There is ongoing debate 
over whether civil RICO should be primarily applied to organized crime 
groups or further extended to include corporate entities, such as banks.144 
In recent years, some courts have sought to limit civil RICO‘s breadth.145  
As with the ATA, and as Part II discusses further, courts have limited the 
application of aiding and abetting liability in civil RICO suits using the 
Supreme Court‘s Central Bank ruling, comparing the RICO civil provision 
to private securities fraud suits under section 10(b).146  For example, in 
1996, a court in the Southern District of New York held that civil aiding 
and abetting liability was not permissible under the RICO civil provision, 
finding, as the Supreme Court did in Central Bank, that the provision‘s 
silence on secondary liability was likely intentional.147  The Third Circuit, 
in Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust,148 also held that courts 
should not infer aiding and abetting liability in civil RICO suits.149 
 
 140. 18 U.S.C. § 1962. 
 141. Id. § 1964.  The provision adds that such recovery shall include reasonable 
attorney‘s fees, but with the qualification that ―no person may rely upon any conduct that 
would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a 
violation of section 1962.‖ Id.  This securities fraud exception does not stand, however, with 
regard to any person criminally convicted for such fraud. Id. 
 142. See 2 OBERMAIER & MORVILLO, supra note 139. 
 143. See H.J. Inc. v Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248 (1989) (recognizing that 
although RICO is focused on targeting organized crime, it is not limited to organized crime); 
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1985) (holding that RICO applies to all 
criminals, not only those involved in organized crime). 
 144. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499 (noting that RICO civil suits ―are being brought almost 
solely against [business enterprises], rather than against the archetypal, intimidating 
mobster‖). 
 145. This includes the Supreme Court. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 
451, 453 (2006) (relying on Holmes v. Sec. Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992), 
to limit civil RICO‘s applicability only to those victims who could prove a direct injury 
resulting from a RICO violation). 
 146. See generally 8 JEROLD S. SOLOVY & R. DOUGLAS REES, BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL 
LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS § 96 (Robert L. Haig ed., 3d. ed. 2005). 
 147. Dep‘t of Econ. Dev. v. Andersen, 924 F. Supp. 449, 475–77 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(finding that ―there is no reason to believe that the omission of language in RICO covering 
aiders and abettors was inadvertent‖). But see In re Melridge, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 93-36184, 
1996 WL 138468, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 27, 1996) (finding that the Supreme Court‘s decision 
in Central Bank was only relevant to Rule 10b-5 and not RICO). 
 148. 155 F.3d 644 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 149. Id. at 657 (―We conclude that the same analysis [as the Court used in Central Bank] 
controls our construction of the civil RICO provision.‖); see also Pa. Ass‘n of Edwards Heirs 
v. Rightenour, 235 F.3d 839, 844 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming Rolo and clarifying that Rolo also 
applied in common law–based RICO cases). 
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Courts have also interpreted RICO civil suits to require clear evidence of 
proximate cause.150  As Part II demonstrates, this has impacted courts‘ 
understanding of ATA primary liability requirements.151 
C.   Some Background on Banks 
This section considers background information on the banking industry 
that is particularly relevant to secondary liability civil suits against banks 
under the ATA. 
1.   Routine Versus Nonroutine Banking Services 
As discussed in this Note‘s Introduction, whether a bank provides a 
terrorist entity with routine services versus nonroutine services could 
determine the outcome of an ATA civil suit.152  Routine banking services 
include the maintenance of bank accounts, the collection and transmission 
of funds, and the provision of account credit card services for clients.153  
Nonroutine banking services extend beyond the realm of typical bank 
services, suggesting a more hands-on approach with greater client 
interaction and involvement.154 
Some courts have declined to hold negligent banks liable for injuries 
linked to funds provided through routine banking services.155  In In re 
Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001,156 the Second Circuit pointed to 
the bank‘s use of routine banking services only as evidence that the link 
between the bank and the injury was too tenuous to afford the plaintiffs 
 
 150. See supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also Reynolds v. E. Dyer Dev. Co., 
882 F.2d 1249, 1253 (7th Cir. 1989); Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1189 (4th Cir. 
1988) (―Civil RICO is of course a statutory tort remedy—simply one with particularly 
drastic remedies.  Causation principles generally applicable to tort liability must be 
considered applicable.  These require not only cause-in-fact, but ‗legal‘ or ‗proximate‘ cause 
as well, the latter involving a policy rather than a purely factual determination:  ‗whether the 
conduct has been so significant and important a cause that the defendant should be held 
responsible.‘‖ (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 42, at 272 (5th ed. 1984))). 
 151. See infra Part II.B.2.a for discussion of Rothstein‘s holding on primary liability. 
 152. See supra Introduction. 
 153. Jason Binimow, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2333(a), Which Allows U.S. Nationals Who Have Been Injured “By Reason of Act of 
International Terrorism” to Sue Therefor and Recover Treble Damages, 195 A.L.R. FED. 
217 (2004).  In Weiss v. National Westminster Bank PLC, the defendant bank argued that the 
material support provision did not include routine banking services as a prohibited activity; 
the court found this particular argument unpersuasive. 453 F. Supp. 2d 609, 624–25 
(E.D.N.Y 2006). 
 154. For additional discussion of such non-routine measures as explained in Linde v. Arab 
Bank, see infra notes 163–66.   
 155. See In Re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013); 
Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 109 (D.D.C. 2003) (―Plaintiffs 
offer no support, and we have found none, for the proposition that a bank is liable for 
injuries done with money that passes through its hands in the form of deposits, withdrawals, 
check clearing services, or any other routine banking service.‖). 
 156. 714 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013). 
2015]  BANK LIABILITY UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM ACT 3409 
relief.157  However, the fact that a bank provided services considered to be 
routine commercial transactions does not per se exempt a bank from 
liability.158  Although some routine banking services might qualify to 
establish primary liability for material support to terrorism, courts must still 
consider whether the services met the threshold for ―substantial assistance‖ 
when evaluating under a secondary liability theory.159  In other words, 
although the routine nature of a bank‘s actions is not necessarily 
dispositive, activities that are regarded as typical day-to-day services can 
demonstrate that the bank had no knowledge that it was aiding a terrorist 
act.160 
Alternatively, the presence of more unusual and specific services can 
suggest just the opposite—that the bank knew that its services were aiding 
terrorism.161  The court in Linde v. Arab Bank162 found that the defendant 
bank‘s alleged actions far exceeded what is considered routine.163  The 
Jordan-based Arab Bank has been at the center of many civil suits aimed at 
bringing justice to terrorism victims.164  In Linde, the plaintiffs, who were 
victims or family of victims killed in Hamas-orchestrated terrorist attacks, 
filed a lawsuit charging the Arab Bank with violating § 2333(a).165  The 
plaintiffs alleged that the banks had knowingly provided banking services 
to Hamas, charities that financially supported the terrorist groups 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas, as well as the Saudi Committee 
in Support of the Intifada al Quds, a group that the plaintiffs alleged 
provided martyr insurance to the families of Hamas suicide bombers.166 
 
 157. Id. at 123–25.  The court relied on Rothstein‘s holding that plaintiffs must 
demonstrate proximate cause to advance a primary liability cause of action under § 2333(a). 
Id.; see also infra Part II.B.  Although the court here was dismissing a primary liability claim 
against the bank, Parts II and III of this Note further explain how the primary liability 
requirements also relate to ATA secondary liability. 
 158. See Sabine Michalowski, No Complicity Liability for Funding Gross Human Rights 
Violations?, 30 BERKELEY J. INT‘L L. 451, 507 (2012) (citing In re Terrorist Attacks on 
September 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 832–34 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)); see also In re Terrorist 
Attacks on September 11, 2001, 718 F. Supp. 2d 456, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Almog v. Arab 
Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Weiss v. Nat‘l Westminster Bank 
PLC, 453 F. Supp. 2d 609, 625 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., No. CV-
06-0702 (CPS), 2006 WL 2862704, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2006); Linde v. Arab Bank, 
PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 588 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 159. See Michalowski, supra note 158, at 487; see also Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. 
Supp. 2d 410, 425 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that the defendant‘s performance of three wire 
transfers for a terrorist group‘s fundraising organization did not fulfill the ―substantial 
assistance‖ element of tort aiding and abetting liability). 
 160. See Michalowski, supra note 158, at 487. 
 161. See id. 
 162. 384 F. Supp. 2d 571 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 163. See id. at 588 (―Given plaintiffs‘ allegations regarding the knowing and intentional 
nature of [Arab] Bank‘s activities, there is nothing ‗routine‘ about the services the Bank is 
alleged to provide.‖). 
 164. See Anti-Terrorism Act Liability for Financial Institutions, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL 
LLP, Sept. 24, 2014, at 2, available at http://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/ 
SC_Publication_Anti_Terrorism_Act_Liability_for_Financial_Institutions.pdf. 
 165. See Linde, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 575. 
 166. See id. at 576–77.  The court noted that although the plaintiffs occasionally referred 
to the payments to the bombers‘ families as insurance, the ―scheme is not alleged to be a 
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In a similar case, Almog v. Arab Bank,167 the plaintiffs also alleged the 
bank‘s involvement with the Saudi Committee.168  In both cases, the Arab 
Bank argued that such services were merely routine—and in both cases, the 
court did not agree.169  The court in Almog explained that the difference 
between routine and nonroutine was tied to the ―knowing and intentional 
nature of the Bank‘s activities.‖170  This conclusion supports the 
understanding that the type of services that a bank provides a terrorist group 
is not automatically indicative of knowledge or intent but can help create a 
strong presumption of the institution‘s mental state.171 
2.   Reliance on List-Making Post–September 11 
After September 11, the United States succeeded in enacting some of the 
changes to the financial system that it had struggled to implement before 
the terrorist attacks.172  The government was assertive in identifying 
terrorism‘s financial backers and freezing these entities‘ assets.173  In 2004, 
the 9/11 Commission reported that the majority of U.S. financial 
institutions had cooperated extensively with the government to patch up 
vulnerabilities in the U.S. financial system.174  Yet, with these successes 
came other consequences—terrorist organizations proved adaptable at 
finding other methods of raising money where traditional systems had 
failed.175 
Following the USA PATRIOT Act‘s enactment in 2001,176 the Treasury 
Department promulgated several regulations to more stringently monitor 
money laundering and terrorism financing.177  Post–September 11, the U.S. 
approach to regulating terrorism financing has largely centered upon a 
practice of list-making.178  The U.S. Secretary of State places groups on the 
 
traditional pooled risk insurance plan,‖ but rather a reward for those who committed suicide 
attacks. Id. at 577. 
 167. See Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 168. Id. at 262–63; Michalowski, supra note 158, at 488–89. 
 169. See Michalowski, supra note 158, at 488–89. 
 170. Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 291. 
 171. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 172. See NAT‘L COMM‘N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., supra note 17, at 381. 
 173. Id. at 382. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 383. 
 176. President George W. Bush signed the PATRIOT Act on October 26, 2001, which 
criminalized terrorism financing.  Congress has renewed and added to the Act since then, 
and it remains in effect today. See supra note 51 and accompanying text; see also Pub. L. 
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); USA PATRIOT Act, U.S. DEP‘T OF TREASURY, FIN. CRIMES 
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/patriot/index.html?r=1&id= 
352#352 (last visited Apr. 23, 2015) (identifying and explaining the PATRIOT Act sections 
affecting financial institutions). 
 177. The crime of money laundering occurs when individuals or organizations make their 
illegally obtained funds appear to be legally obtained; in other words, when an entity makes 
―dirty money‖ appear to be clean. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957 (2012).  The crime requires a 
predicate offense, which can be, but is not limited to, murder, kidnapping, arson, robbery, 
bribery, extortion, and drug dealing. Id. 
 178. See Terrorist Financing, supra note 16, at 9. 
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Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations list (―FTOs list‖), while OFAC, 
under IEEPA authority, maintains the Specially Designated Global 
Terrorists list (―SDGT list‖).179 
The SDGT list was born out of an executive order that grants OFAC the 
authority to freeze the bank accounts and block the assets of entities 
appearing on this list.180  It applies only to U.S. persons and U.S. financial 
institutions.181  The SDGT list incorporates the State Department‘s FTO list 
as well as numerous other individuals and groups.182  OFAC also maintains 
a master list called the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons 
list (―SDN list‖), which combines OFAC and State Department lists, 
including the SST list.183 
The SST list was created under the authority of section 6(j) of the Export 
Administration Act, which empowers the Secretary of State to designate 
certain countries as state sponsors of terrorism.184  A country is designated 
a state sponsor of terrorism when the U.S. Secretary of State determines 
that the country‘s government ―repeatedly provided support for acts of 
international terrorism.‖185  As of early 2015, the SST list includes only 
Iran, Sudan, Syria, and Cuba.186  OFAC has consequently enacted 
counterterrorism sanctions against these countries.187 
3.   Are Banks the Best Chance of Redress for Victims of Terrorism? 
The ATA‘s legislative history indicates that Congress intended to provide 
victims of international terrorism with tools for civil redress.188  Parts of 
this history directly address terrorism financing.189  In an amicus brief 
submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs-petitioners in Boim v. Quranic Literacy 
Institute (Boim I),190 the United States argued that secondary liability would 
 
 179. See id. at 9–11; see also 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1702 (2012) (permitting the prosecution 
of individuals who willfully conduct financial transactions with groups or individuals whom 
the President considers to be a national security threat). 
 180. See Terrorist Financing, supra note 16, at 11; see also Exec. Order No. 13,224, 15 
C.F.R. pt. 744.12 (2001). 
 181. See id.; see also  Weiss v. Nat‘l Westminster Bank, PLC, 936 F. Supp. 2d 100, 118 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated and remanded, 768 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 182. See Terrorist Financing, supra note 16, at 11. 
 183. See U.S. DEP‘T OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL SPECIALLY 
DESIGNATED NATIONALS AND BLOCKED PERSONS LIST (Jan. 2, 2015), available at 
https://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/t11sdn.pdf; see also AUDREY KURTH CRONIN ET 
AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32120, THE ―FTO LIST‖ AND CONGRESS:  SANCTIONING 
DESIGNATED FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 4–5, 
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32120.pdf. 
 184. 50 U.S.C. § 2405(j); see also Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 
93 Stat. 503 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401–2420). 
 185. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(6) (2012). 
 186. See State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/ 
j/ct/list/c14151.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2015). 
 187. See Levin v. Bank of N.Y., No. 09 CV 5900 RPP, 2011 WL 812032, at *13 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2011). 
 188. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 189. See supra note 73. 
 190. 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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better promote Congress‘s objective of compensating terrorism victims and 
deterring international terrorism.191  In enacting the ATA, Congress may 
have intended to deter not only terrorist organizations themselves but also 
terrorism‘s financial backers.192 
Secondary liability for banks under the ATA arguably provides the best 
chance of redress for terrorism victims.193  This argument is typically based 
on the understanding that banks have ―deep pockets‖ and therefore are 
capable of paying damages awards.194  Notably, most plaintiffs have been 
unable to collect court judgments against state sponsors of terrorism.195  
State defendants have generally defaulted, and their assets have typically 
been unreachable.196  For example, in 2012 in Wultz v. Islamic Republic of 
Iran,197 a federal district court ordered Iran and Syria (both U.S.-designated 
state sponsors of terrorism)198 to pay the plaintiffs $300 million in punitive 
damages.199  Given that the likelihood of recovery from terrorist states is 
dim, victims may prefer a judgment against a bank.200 
The court in Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development 
(Boim III) noted the difficulty in collecting judgments against terrorists or 
their organizations directly.201  The court concluded that suing the financial 
backers of terrorism would have a more powerful deterrent effect and 
would serve to ―cut the terrorists‘ lifeline.‖202  In addition, the court found 
that providing financial aid to a terrorist group, while not inherently violent, 
could be considered dangerous to human life, as ―[g]iving money to 
Hamas‖ was ―like giving a loaded gun to a child.‖203  Boim I also noted that 
 
 191. Boim I Brief, supra note 68, at 18–19. 
 192. Van Schaack, supra note 53, at 392–93 (―The hope was that allowing civil liability 
would provide an extra measure of deterrence, especially for entities that might financially 
support acts of terrorism while not engaging in violent acts directly.‖). 
 193. See Jack D. Smith & Gregory J. Cooper, Disrupting Terrorist Financing with Civil 
Litigation, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 65, 80 (2009). 
 194. See Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 61 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 195. See Smith & Cooper, supra note 193, at 79. 
 196. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31258, SUITS AGAINST 
TERRORIST STATES BY VICTIMS OF TERRORISM, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS (2008), available 
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL31258.pdf (―The limited availability of defendant 
States‘ assets for satisfaction of judgments has made collection difficult.‖); see also Boim III, 
549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 197. 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 61 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 198. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 199. Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 864 F. Supp. 2d 24, 42 (D.D.C. 2012). The court 
reviled Syria and Iran, stating:  ―When a state chooses to use terror as a policy tool—as Iran 
and Syria continue to do—that state forfeits its sovereign immunity and deserves unadorned 
condemnation.  Barbaric acts like [the suicide attack that killed Daniel Wultz] have no place 
in civilized society and represent a moral depravity that knows no bounds.‖ Id. at 43. 
 200. See Smith & Cooper, supra note 193, at 80. 
 201. See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 690 (―Damages are a less effective remedy against 
terrorists and their organizations than against their financial angels.‖).  For other examples 
demonstrating the difficulty in collecting such judgments, see generally Ungar v. Palestine 
Liberation Organization, 402 F.3d 274, 276 (1st Cir. 2005); Biton v. Palestinian Interim 
Self-Government Authority, 252 F.R.D. 1, 1 (D.D.C. 2008); Knox v. Palestine Liberation 
Organization, 248 F.R.D. 420, 423 (S.D.N.Y 2008). 
 202. Boim III, 549 F.3d at 691. 
 203. Id. at 690. 
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it would be ―bizarre‖ for Congress to enact a statute where collecting 
damages would be so unlikely.204 
Finally, the burden of proof in civil suits is lower than in criminal 
cases.205  Thus, civil suits likely provide a better opportunity to hold 
terrorism aiders and abettors accountable than criminal prosecutions.206 
There are also potential arguments against propping up banks as a 
potential target in terrorism suits.207  U.S. plaintiffs suing foreign banks 
may lead to complicated issues of international diplomacy.208  One 
argument is that Congress did not intend for banks to be included as a 
potential defendant class under § 2333(a).209  Furthermore, banks have 
defended themselves against civil suits by arguing that they complied with 
the regulations of the country where the bank was located.210  Finally, in 
pursuing banks under a secondary liability theory, there exists a risk that 
courts could impose unjust costs on innocent financial institutions that 
provide necessary economic services to society.211 
II.   THE CONFLICTING CASE LAW ON ATA SECONDARY LIABILITY 
This part looks closer at the split among federal courts on ATA 
secondary liability in private civil suits.  Part II.A presents the most 
significant case law in favor of secondary liability, focusing on Wultz and 
Boim I.212  Part II.B then presents the case law holding against secondary 
liability, with a focus on the Second Circuit‘s ruling in Rothstein v. UBS 
AG213 and the Seventh Circuit‘s overturning of Boim I in Boim III, its en 
banc rehearing of the case. 
A.   The Case Law Permitting Private ATA Suits  
Under a Secondary Liability Theory 
This section addresses those courts that have held in favor of secondary 
liability.  Although the defendant in the Boim case was a charity, and not a 
 
 204. Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1021 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 205. See Smith & Cooper, supra note 193, at 74.  The standard for civil suits is ―clear and 
convincing evidence‖ or a ―preponderance of evidence‖ rather than proof ―beyond a 
reasonable doubt.‖ Id. 
 206. See Adam B. Weiss, From the Bonannos to the bin Ladens:  The Reves Operation or 
Management Test and the Viability of Civil RICO Suits Against Financial Supporters of 
Terrorism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1123, 1165 (2010). 
 207. See generally Sant, supra note 14 (presenting several reasons why banks should not 
be targeted under the ATA). 
 208. See, e.g., Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 950 F. Supp. 2d 459, 460 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 209. Id. at 535, 544–45 (arguing that the ATA civil provision was enacted as a largely 
symbolic law, intended to target terrorist actors and not banks). 
 210. See, e.g., Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 523, 538 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(finding that ―[c]ompliance with Lebanese law sheds light on the Bank‘s mental state‖); 
Weiss v. Nat‘l Westminster Bank, 936 F. Supp. 2d 100, 111, 116–117 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(discussing Natwest‘s argument that it should not be held liable under the ATA, as it had not 
conducted business with any U.K.-designated terrorist groups). 
 211. See Sant, supra note 14, at 599. 
 212. Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 213. 708 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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bank, courts have applied the Boim I and Boim III rulings on secondary 
liability to cases involving banks.214  While the Seventh Circuit eventually 
shifted its stance in Boim III, its original holding in Boim I laid the 
framework for other holdings permitting secondary liability.  This section 
focuses on the D.C. District Court‘s ruling in Wultz. 
The Boim story began with the 1996 killing of David Boim, a dual 
American and Israeli citizen, near Jerusalem.215  In 2000, David‘s parents 
filed a lawsuit against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and 
Development and other defendants.216  The family alleged that Hamas was 
responsible for David‘s death and that the defendants had provided financial 
support to the organization in violation of § 2333(a).217  The district court 
denied the defendants‘ motion to dismiss the complaint, and the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed the district court‘s ruling, finding that the ATA civil 
provision provided for a secondary liability private cause of action.218 
The Wultz court frequently refers to the Boim I ruling.219  In 2006, 
sixteen-year-old Daniel Wultz was eating at a restaurant in Tel Aviv, Israel, 
with his father when a member of PIJ approached the restaurant.220  When a 
security guard at the restaurant‘s entrance stopped the man, he detonated 
five kilograms of explosives, killing himself and ten others, including 
Daniel.221 
In 2008, Daniel‘s parents filed a $300 million civil suit under the ATA 
against Iran, Syria, and Bank of China.222  The plaintiffs argued that Bank 
of China aided and abetted PIJ in its execution of the terrorist attack that 
killed their son.223  Under this theory, the plaintiffs contended that Bank of 
China should be held liable because its provision of financial services to the 
 
 214. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 215. Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1002. 
 216. Id. at 1003.  The family also sued the Quranic Literacy Institute, the American 
Muslim Society, and Muhammad Salah, a former employee of the Quranic Literacy Institute. 
See Mike Robinson, Court Upholds $156M Palestinian Terror Verdict, USA TODAY (Dec. 3, 
2008), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-12-03-3866513362_x.htm. 
 217. Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1002–03. 
 218. See id. at 1021. 
 219. See generally Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010). 
 220. See Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 864 F. Supp. 2d 24, 27 (D.D.C. 2012).  
Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip formed PIJ in the 1970s with the purpose of establishing 
an Islamic state and launching attacks against Israeli civilian and military targets; Iran is the 
main financial backer of the group. See Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), NAT‘L 
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/pij.html (last visited Apr. 23, 
2015). 
 221. Raphael Ahern, US Court Orders Syria to Pay $330 Million to Bereaved Family of 
2006 TA Bombing Victim, TIMES OF ISRAEL (May 15, 2012), http://www.timesofisrael. 
com/us-court-orders-syria-to-pay-330-million-to-bereaved-family-of-2006-ta-suicide-
bombing/.  Following his death, Abu Nasser, one of the leaders of a terrorist group linked 
with the PIJ, declared Daniel the ―best target combination we can dream of—American and 
Zionist.‖ See Aaron Klein, Comatose Florida Teen „Best Target We Can Dream Of,‟ 
WORLDNETDAILY (Apr. 27, 2006), http://www.wnd.com/2006/04/35925/. 
 222. See Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 18. The plaintiffs pleaded in the alternative that Bank 
of China was directly liable under the ATA as well as liable under Israeli law. Id. 
 223. Id. at 19. 
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PIJ furthered an act of international terrorism.224  The plaintiffs claimed that 
prior to the attack that killed Daniel, Bank of China had executed dozens of 
wire transfers for a PIJ agent that amounted to millions of dollars.225  They 
also contended that the bank had known that it was providing services to a 
terrorist group but had persisted with its actions anyway.226  Bank of China 
contended that an aiding and abetting cause of action did not exist under the 
ATA and moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim.227 
The Wultz court held for the plaintiffs.228  The court‘s ruling hinged on 
its determination that courts should treat the ATA civil provision differently 
than the Supreme Court had treated the 1934 Act‘s section 10(b) in Central 
Bank.229  The Wultz court noted that it was wary of inferring aiding and 
abetting liability following Central Bank.230  Nevertheless, the court drew 
the same line between the ATA and private securities fraud suits that the 
Boim I court had drawn previously.231 
Bank of China argued that the court should interpret Central Bank as 
totally precluding any secondary liability reading when such a theory was 
not explicitly laid out in the statute.232  The court agreed that there was a 
general presumption against aiding and abetting liability when the statute 
did not expressly provide for such liability.233  However, the court 
determined that this presumption was rebuttable where there was strong 
evidence of congressional intent to permit secondary liability.234 
Wultz‘s rationale for rebutting Central Bank‘s presumption arose directly 
from Boim I‘s analysis.235  Boim I found that Central Bank‘s holding 
―provide[d] guidance but [was] not determinative‖ because it addressed a 
 
 224. Id. at 54.  This theory contrasts with the plaintiffs‘ simultaneously pleaded theory 
that the bank‘s provision of funds was in itself an act of terrorism under the ATA. Id. at 19. 
 225. Id. at 44–45; Jesse D. H. Snyder, Reading Between the Lines:  Statutory Silence and 
Congressional Intent Under the Antiterrorism Act, 1 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUDIES 265, 286 
(2012). 
 226. Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 46 (―Israeli officials allegedly informed China, which 
informed [Bank of China], that the transfers were enabling the terrorist activities of the 
PIJ.‖).  
 227. Id. at 54.  Bank of China only argued that the secondary liability claim did not exist 
under the ATA and did not alternatively argue that the plaintiffs failed to plead the necessary 
elements of the claim, should it exist. Id. at 57. 
 228. Id. at 82. 
 229. Id. at 54–56.  See supra Part II.B.2.a for an overview of Central Bank‘s holding on 
secondary liability for private securities fraud claims. 
 230. Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 54.  See supra Part I.B.2.a for a discussion of Central 
Bank. 
 231. Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 54. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 55 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 
182 (1994)). 
 234. Id. at 57.  Similarly, other courts have applied secondary liability in the face of 
statutory silence despite Central Bank. See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat‘l Bank Ltd., 504 
F.3d 254, 282 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that Central Bank‘s presumption was rebutted by an 
international norm recognizing claims of aiding and abetting violations of international law). 
 235. Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 55; see also Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 
500 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (observing that Wultz relied on Boim I‘s reasoning and finding that 
§ 2333(a) provided for secondary liability). 
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statute that only inferred a private right of action, whereas § 2333(a)‘s 
private right of action was explicit.236  Such reasoning suggests that the 
difference between implied and express private rights of action is sufficient 
to distinguish Central Bank from ATA civil litigation.237 
Wultz likewise determined that Congress had intended for the ATA to be 
construed broadly using traditional tort law principles; for this reason, the 
D.C. District Court permitted the aiding and abetting claim against Bank of 
China.238  This argument is closely linked with those courts‘ assertions that 
the ATA is distinguishable from the 1933 and 1934 Acts and is therefore 
outside of Central Bank‘s control.239 
The court in Boim I insisted that the ATA‘s legislative history evinces 
clear intent to incorporate the full apparatus of traditional tort law into the 
ATA.240  Wultz also relied on Senator Grassley‘s statement that the ATA 
provides victims of international terrorism with ―all the weapons‖ available 
to civil plaintiffs241 as well as the ―remedies of American tort law‖242 as 
evidence that Congress intended to include secondary liability in the 
statute.243  Logic would seem to dictate that if Congress intended the ATA 
to incorporate all of the elements of traditional tort law, then it must have 
intended aiding and abetting theory—viable under traditional tort law—to 
apply to cases involving banks and international terrorism.244  The 
legislature‘s discussion of the ―causal chain of terrorism‖ would necessarily 
include aiders and abettors.245 
The court in Goldberg v. UBS AG246 noted that the ATA‘s legislative 
history and language reflect an intention to give U.S. nationals broad 
opportunities for relief.247  The courts in Wultz and Boim I also made such a 
connection, arguing that Congress‘s intent supported an accurate 
interpretation of the ATA‘s language.248  Wultz found that the ATA civil 
provision did not place any limits on a potential defendant because the 
language only required that the plaintiff be injured ―by reason of an act of 
international terrorism.‖249  In supporting this conclusion, the court cited 
 
 236. Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1019 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 237. Gill, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 500 (discussing the Wultz argument in favor of 
distinguishing ATA cases from Central Bank). 
 238. See Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 55; see also Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1019. 
 239. See supra Part II.A. 
 240. Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1010 (citing 137 CONG. REC. 4511 (1991)). 
 241. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 242. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
 243. Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 56 (citing 137 CONG. REC. 4511). 
 244. See, e.g., id. at 55; Boim I Brief, supra note 68, at 9–10. 
 245. See supra note 73 and accompanying text; see also Boim I Brief, supra note 68, at 
17. 
 246. 660 F. Supp. 2d 410 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 247. Id. at 422 (finding that the ATA‘s ―legislative history as well as the language of the 
statute‖ suggested an intent to provide plaintiffs with ―broad remedies in a procedurally 
privileged U.S. forum‖).  However, Goldberg did not rule directly on the question of 
whether the ATA provided for secondary liability. 
 248. Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 55. 
 249. Id.; see also supra note 35 and accompanying text.  This ―by reason of‖ language is 
common to a number of statutes, including RICO; in such cases, courts have found this 
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Molzof v. United States250 for the proposition that a statute‘s language 
should be discerned in light of the common law principles Congress 
intended to apply to the statute.251 
Boim I similarly looked to the ATA‘s language in considering secondary 
liability.252  The court focused on the definition of international terrorism 
provided at § 2331(1) and the meaning of the word ―involve‖ in the context 
of § 2333(a).253  Wultz concurred with Boim I‘s conclusion that this 
definition, and the pointed reference to criminal law, meant that Congress 
intended to make the ATA‘s civil provision ―at least as extensive as 
criminal liability.‖254  Boim I and Wultz therefore concluded that where 
criminal secondary liability would be available (through 18 U.S.C. § 2), 
civil secondary liability must follow.255 
Once the Wultz court determined that secondary liability existed under 
the ATA, it applied the standard to evaluating civil aiding and abetting 
liability established in Halberstam.256  In following the Halberstam 
approach, which incorporated the Restatement, a plaintiff must demonstrate 
that the defendant (1) was ―generally aware of his role as part of an overall 
illegal or tortious activity at the time that‖ the assistance was provided and 
(2) ―knowingly and substantially‖ assisted in the violation.257 
In applying tort law principles to a secondary liability claim, the Wultz 
court emphasized the importance of establishing a causal link between Bank 
of China and the terrorist attack in question.258  The court noted that where 
there was no allegation that a bank had direct ties to a terrorist group or had 
the requisite knowledge that it was aiding a terrorist group, the ―mere 
provision of routine banking services that benefited‖ the group in a 
―general, nondescript manner‖ would not establish jurisdiction over the 
bank.259  While this point directly addresses jurisdiction, it also suggests 
that a simply negligent bank does not form a strong enough nexus between 
a defendant bank and the terrorist act to warrant ATA liability.260  On the 
other hand, the court would likely require that a bank manifest some degree 
of knowledge.261  Such a connection is also necessary to establish that the 
 
language to establish a proximate cause requirement when a plaintiff pleads primary 
liability. See supra note 35. 
 250. 502 U.S. 301 (1992). 
 251. Id. at 305–07. 
 252. Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1009 (7th Cir. 2002) (―We look to the language in order to 
determine what Congress intended, and we also look to the statute‘s structure, subject matter, 
context and history for this same purpose.‖). 
 253. Id. at 1009–10; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (1992). 
 254. Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 55 (quoting Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1020). 
 255. See Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1020; Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 55. 
 256. See supra Part I.B.1; see also Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 57. 
 257. Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 57 (quoting Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983)); see also supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text (discussing Halberstam‘s 
facts and the Supreme Court‘s description of the opinion as ―comprehensive‖). 
 258. See Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 34. 
 259. Id. (quoting In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 718 F. Supp. 2d 456, 
488–90 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)). 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
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bank knowingly provided substantial assistance to those who carried out the 
terrorist attack.262 
The Wultz court contrasted the case against Bank of China263 with Licci 
v. American Express Bank.264  In Licci, the court dismissed negligence 
claims under the ATA civil provision on the basis that the defendant bank 
had only provided routine banking services, including wire transfers, that 
allegedly aided Hamas in executing a terrorist attack.265  The Licci court 
found that it was not reasonably foreseeable that routine banking services 
would result in rocket attacks in Israel.266  The Wultz court rejected Bank of 
China‘s argument that its case was analogous to Licci, because the plaintiffs 
alleged that Bank of China had provided banking services to PIJ with the 
knowledge that the services would aid the group in carrying out terrorist 
attacks.267  The court found that this allegation of knowledge suggested the 
bank had conducted nonroutine services, therefore fulfilling the proximate 
cause element.268 
The Wultz court‘s analysis therefore permits ATA secondary liability and 
suggests that, for a claim predicated upon such a theory to succeed against a 
bank, the bank in question must manifest a more culpable mental state than 
negligence.269 
B.   Courts Against Secondary Liability Under the ATA 
This section examines courts that have come out on the other side, 
holding that no such claim is possible under the ATA.  This section begins 
with the Seventh Circuit‘s holding in Boim III, in which the court rejected 
Boim I‘s attempt to distinguish the ATA from Central Bank and instead 
offered a ―chain of incorporations‖ theory that plaintiffs could potentially 
use to hold banks liable under a primary liability theory—albeit one that 
bears some resemblance to secondary liability.  This section then shifts its 
focus to the Second Circuit‘s recent ruling against secondary liability in 
Rothstein v. UBS AG, where the court found no space for a secondary 
liability cause of action and required a showing of proximate cause for 
primary liability claims. 
 
 262. Id. at 66.  The Wultz court found that whether such a connection existed was a 
factual matter for trial, as the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded the connection in the 
complaint. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. 704 F. Supp. 2d 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), vacated in part by Licci ex rel. Licci v. 
Lebanese Canadian Bank, 732 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 265. Id. at 410–11. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 66. 
 268. Id. (―The banking services allegedly provided by BOC to the PIJ are, therefore, by 
no means the routine sort of services provided by the correspondent bank to the Lebanese 
bank [in Licci].‖). 
 269. Id. at 57. 
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1.   The Seventh Circuit in Boim III 
The defendants again appealed after the Boim I ruling, at which point the 
Seventh Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded to the district court.270  
Finally, the plaintiffs petitioned for a rehearing with the Seventh Circuit en 
banc.271  The en banc court in Boim III then held that the ATA did not 
provide a secondary liability cause of action, overruling the Seventh 
Circuit‘s holding in Boim I.272  However, Boim III‘s approach to primary 
liability has left the door open to liability for banks using a statutory chain 
of incorporations by reference, an approach that has similar characteristics 
to secondary liability.273 
Courts have found that it is Central Bank‘s reasoning—not its subject 
matter—that applies to ATA cases where a plaintiff seeks to use a 
secondary liability theory.274  Judge Richard Posner, in his opinion for 
Boim III, disagreed with the finding in Boim I that the instant case was 
distinguishable from Central Bank.275  In his opinion, the Boim I court gave 
too much weight to the fact that a private cause of action in section 10(b) 
cases was implicit while the ATA‘s was explicit.276  Judge Posner 
considered this comparison irrelevant because the Central Bank holding 
extended to government suits as well as private suits.277  Judge Posner 
noted that section 10(b) expressly authorized SEC suits.278  He therefore 
concluded that, in the context of the ATA, ―statutory silence on the subject 
of secondary liability means there is none.‖279 
As support for this finding, Judge Posner cited congressional action taken 
shortly after the Supreme Court‘s Central Bank ruling.280  The year 
following the ruling, Congress enacted a law that permitted the SEC to 
pursue those who aided and abetted securities fraud.281  Judge Posner 
concluded that this legislation demonstrated that, even though the SEC 
possessed an express cause of action, secondary liability was not 
permissible until Congress expressly authorized such liability.282  
 
 270. Boim III, 549 F.3d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 271. See id. 
 272. See id. at 685. 
 273. See id. at 690. 
 274. See Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 499 (E.D.N.Y 2012) (citing 
Freeman v. DirectTV, Inc., 457 F.3d 1001, 1006 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
 275. See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 689. 
 276. See id.; see also Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1019 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 277. See Boim III, 549 F.3d at 689 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank 
of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 200 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id.  The provision states that 
any person that knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to another 
person in violation of a provision of this chapter, or of any rule or regulation issued 
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15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012). 
 282. Boim III, 549 F.3d 685, 689 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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Furthermore, in 2008 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its Central Bank 
holding and stated clearly that the decision also applied to SEC suits, not 
merely private actions.283 
In its dismissal of the secondary liability interpretation, Boim III offered 
as an alternative the ―chain of incorporations‖ theory of primary liability 
available under the material support provision.284  This court, as well as 
many others, has concluded that the material support crime as pleaded 
under § 2339B constitutes an act of ―international terrorism.‖285 
Boim III‘s logic presupposes a seamless combination of the ATA civil 
provision, the material support provisions, and the ATA‘s definition of 
international terrorism under § 2331(1).  The court argued that Congress 
had intended courts to play these provisions off of one another.286  
According to the court in Boim III, in using the material support crime in 
conjunction with § 2333(a), plaintiffs would be combining the secondary 
liability nature of the material support provision (which explicitly 
incorporates criminal secondary liability) with a primary liability theory 
under the ATA civil provision.287  According to Judge Posner ―primary 
liability in the form of material support to terrorism has the character of 
secondary liability.‖288  Thus, he argued, Congress had in fact expressly 
imposed liability on a class of aiders and abettors via a statutory ―chain of 
incorporations by reference.‖289 
Under this theory, a plaintiff begins at § 2333(a), which provides that a 
plaintiff must have been injured ―by reason of an act of international 
terrorism.‖290  A plaintiff could then move to § 2339B, which prohibits 
knowingly providing support to a terrorist organization or attempting or 
conspiring to do so.291  Furthermore, because the Supreme Court in 
Humanitarian Law Project held that the material support provision‘s 
knowledge requirement only extended to knowledge that the material 
 
 283. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 156–59 
(2008).  Judge Posner also suggested that to permit a secondary liability private action under 
the ATA would overextend federal courts‘ extraterritorial jurisdiction. Boim III, 549 F.3d at 
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 284. Boim III, 549 F.3d at 690. 
 285. See Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1015 (7th Cir. 2002); Abecassis v. Wyatt, 704 F. Supp. 
2d 623 (S.D. Tex. 2010); Goldberg v. UBS AG, 690 F. Supp. 2d 92, 114 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); 
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and 2331(1)] are part of the same statutory scheme.‖ Id. (citing Perry, supra note 35, at 
257)). 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 691. 
 289. Id. at 692. 
 290. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012). 
 291. Id. § 2339B. 
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support would go to a designated terrorist organization, a defendant need 
not know that its support was specifically going toward terrorist acts.292 
Other courts have considered this possibility as a potential alternative to 
permitting secondary liability under the ATA on the basis of the statute‘s 
language and legislative history.293  For instance, in September 2014, the 
Second Circuit in Weiss v. National Westminster Bank294 reversed the 
Eastern District of New York‘s grant of summary judgment to National 
Westminster Bank of Scotland (―Natwest‖), in a case where the material 
support law served as the basis for primary liability under the ATA.295  The 
plaintiffs had accused Natwest of providing material support to Hamas via 
transferring funds and maintaining accounts on behalf of a group called 
Interpal.296  The Second Circuit reversed and remanded to the lower court 
on the basis that the court should have incorporated into § 2333(a) the 
mental state required of material support criminal suits—in other words, 
knowledge that the group was a terrorist organization, as established in 
Humanitarian Law Project.297  While Interpal was located on OFAC‘s 
SDGT list, neither the British government nor the European Union had 
designated the group as a terrorist organization.298  As the SDGT only 
applies to U.S. financial institutions and U.S. persons,299 it remains unclear 
whether OFAC sanctions against a state sponsor of terrorism or the 
presence of a group or individual on an OFAC list serves as constructive 
notice for foreign banks providing services to such entities.300  Perhaps, as 
the district court in Weiss suggested, such a question is ―better suited for the 
political branches of government.‖301 
2.   The Second Circuit‘s Take on Secondary Liability 
Until 2012, the Second Circuit served as fertile ground for secondary 
liability suits against banks.302  Then, two decisions, one in the Second 
Circuit and one in the Eastern District of New York, took apart secondary 
liability but in different ways.  In Rothstein, the Second Circuit overturned 
years of case law and indicated a turning of the tide against secondary 
 
 292. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 16–18 (2012). 
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Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 199 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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liability.  In Gill v. Arab Bank,303 a court in the Eastern District found 
Congress did not intend for secondary liability under the ATA.   
a.   Rothstein Raises the Bar 
The plaintiffs in Rothstein were U.S. citizens who pleaded that they had 
been injured, or their relatives had been injured, in terrorist attacks in Israel 
spanning from July 30, 1997 to July 22, 2006.304  Hamas and Hezbollah 
were responsible for the attacks, which consisted of five bombings and 
multiple rocket launchings.305  The plaintiffs alleged that UBS AG , a Swiss 
bank with U.S. offices, had facilitated U.S. currency transactions with 
Iran,306 which, in turn, funded Hamas, Hezbollah, and PIJ with the intent to 
aid in the commission of terrorist attacks.307  They brought a claim under 
§ 2333(a) that the bank had aided and abetted international terrorism.308 
In 2013, the Second Circuit upheld the decision of the district court to 
dismiss plaintiffs‘ secondary liability claim against UBS, finding that such a 
claim predicated upon § 2333(a) did not exist.309  Rothstein found that the 
ATA‘s implementation of criminal provisions established a form of aiding 
and abetting liability but did not expressly address Boim III‘s ―chain of 
incorporations‖ approach.310  The court observed that, given Congress‘s 
express provision for secondary liability in other areas of the law, the civil 
provision‘s silence on the issue was likely intentional.311  The court noted 
that Congress could take action to explicitly create a secondary liability 
private cause of action under § 2333(a) in the future.312 
The court also dismissed the plaintiffs‘ attempt to hold UBS liable under 
a primary liability theory, finding that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated 
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cause of action.‖ (emphasis omitted)). 
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the necessary proximate cause linking the bank with the terrorist attacks.313  
The court supported this holding by analogizing the ATA‘s language to the 
language in the RICO civil provision, which also incorporated the ―by 
reason of‖ phrase.314  This finding contrasts with Boim III, which made no 
mention of a proximate cause requirement.315 
b.   Gill v. Arab Bank 
In Gill, a case out of the Eastern District of New York, the court 
methodically dismantled the Wultz and Boim I approach to secondary 
liability.  The Gill court instead sided with Boim III, finding little difference 
conceptually between ATA cases and Central Bank.316  The Gill court 
viewed the issue as whether federal courts have the power to infer 
secondary liability in a civil statute where Congress made no mention of 
it.317 
The court in Gill gave greater consideration to Wultz and Boim I‘s 
emphasis on the ATA‘s legislative history than did the courts in Boim III or 
Rothstein.318  The Gill court cautiously weighed the argument that Congress 
intended the ATA private cause of action to include secondary liability and 
ultimately dismissed this analysis.319  The court argued that Wultz‘s reliance 
on legislative history was ―contrary to the realities of the legislative 
process.‖320  The court claimed that Wultz wrongfully assumed that 
Congress, in enacting the ATA, acted on a unified front on a point of law 
that was not addressed in the statute‘s text itself.321 
The court also scrutinized certain aspects of the congressional record.322  
For instance, in his testimony, Joseph Morris indicated that he believed 
secondary liability could be found when an entity was negligent.323  
However, Gill noted that this understanding of the law was inconsistent 
with the ATA‘s provision of treble damages, which are generally not 
available in negligence cases.324  Gill also suggested that to apply § 2333(a) 
to all aspects of civil litigation would be unreasonable—and argued that 
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even proponents of secondary liability have essentially recognized this fact, 
as they have not attempted to pursue the tort theory of strict liability.325 
Gill also challenged Boim I‘s assertion that Congress intended § 2333(a) 
to be as extensive as criminal liability in terrorism cases.326  The court 
argued that, instead, Congress‘s enactment of a general criminal secondary 
liability statute shows that Congress knows how to provide for such liability 
if it wants to.327  According to the court, the absence of such a statutory 
provision demonstrated that Congress did not intend to create secondary 
liability under the ATA.328 
III.   RESOLVING THE SECONDARY LIABILITY CONUNDRUM 
The case law on secondary liability under the ATA has posed a number 
of questions:  Are these banks innocent institutions wrongfully swept up in 
litigation over heinous crimes they did not commit?  Or are banks part of 
the larger problem of terrorism financing, and the most practical source of 
relief for terrorism victims? 
Unsurprisingly, the answers to these questions depend on the specific 
facts of each case.  While ATA cases involving banks vary,329 organizing 
them into three general categories allows for helpful analysis of the 
secondary liability issue:  (1) cases where the defendant bank engaged in 
routine financial services and demonstrated negligence, at most; (2) cases 
where the bank‘s activities extended beyond routine services to the point 
where the bank could potentially be liable under a primary liability theory; 
and (3) cases where the connection between the terrorist group and the bank 
was likely too tenuous for primary liability, yet the bank intentionally and 
extensively engaged with a state sponsor of terrorism or a party on OFAC‘s 
SDGT list.330 
Part III of this Note argues that the language of the ATA civil provision 
does not extend to secondary liability, and therefore banks, under current 
law, cannot be charged with aiding and abetting terrorist attacks.  Part III.A 
explains why legislative history does not rebut the presumption against 
secondary liability that the Supreme Court established in Central Bank.331  
Terrorism victims will therefore have no course of redress against the first 
category of banking cases, as primary liability will not be an option without 
the kinds of red flags that indicate the bank‘s knowledge that it is directly 
aiding a terrorist entity.  Part III.A also demonstrates why the ATA 
currently does not provide for bank liability in the second or third category 
of banking cases.  The absence of a viable cause of action in these cases, 
where the defendant bank‘s conduct goes far beyond routine financial 
services, is arguably undesirable.  Accordingly, Part III.B suggests that 
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Congress amend the ATA to expressly permit secondary liability suits.  
This Note proposes that such an amendment should incorporate a mental 
state threshold of extreme recklessness or intent, and that courts should 
apply the Halberstam standard of requiring ―substantial assistance‖ to the 
tortfeasor.332  While this concept is embedded within JASTA, that bill has 
other features upon which this Note does not directly comment.333  This 
Note refrains from completely endorsing JASTA and only speaks to the 
secondary liability issue under the ATA. 
A.   The ATA Does Not Provide a Viable Avenue for Holding Banks Liable 
for Acts of International Terrorism 
Part III.A addresses why courts should not follow the Wultz court‘s 
finding that the ATA civil provision permits secondary liability private 
actions.  This section additionally explains the often-overlooked 
implications of the ATA‘s definition of ―international terrorism‖ at 
§ 2331(1).334  As this section demonstrates, this definition includes an 
intent requirement that is at odds with a ―chain of incorporations‖ theory 
based upon the ATA‘s material support provision.  As a result, only 
defendant banks that have committed acts that conform to the current 
definition of ―international terrorism‖ should be held liable under the ATA. 
1.   The ATA‘s Legislative History Does Not Overcome the Central Bank 
Presumption Against Secondary Liability 
Wultz, in permitting secondary liability claims under the ATA, relied 
heavily upon legislative history.335  In particular, Wultz relied on Senator 
Grassley‘s statement that the purpose of the ATA was to supply terrorism 
victims with all of the weapons available to civil plaintiffs under traditional 
tort law theory.336  As a sponsor of the ATA, Grassley‘s statement should 
bear some weight, and aiding and abetting liability is a traditional tort law 
principle.337 
However, the presumption against secondary liability that the Supreme 
Court established in Central Bank is difficult to overcome.338  As the 
Eastern District noted in Gill, the issue in Central Bank was whether federal 
courts generally had the power to infer secondary liability when a statute 
was silent on the topic.339  The Supreme Court in Central Bank offered no 
indication that its ruling was only limited to securities fraud private suits.340  
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In fact, the Court held that there was generally no presumption in favor of 
reading aiding and abetting into a statute that was silent on the issue of 
secondary liability.341  Congress could have easily indicated in § 2333(a) 
that secondary liability was available.  Many courts, including the Second 
Circuit in Rothstein, have reached this conclusion in recent years.342 
The Boim III court rightly pointed out that the Supreme Court‘s ruling in 
Central Bank applied not only to the implied private right of action under 
section 10(b) but also to the expressly granted government right of 
action.343  This fact significantly diminishes Boim I‘s argument that courts 
should treat civil secondary liability in ATA and securities fraud cases 
differently.  In addition, the language of the ATA is very much in line with 
the statutory language of the RICO civil provision, which states:  ―Any 
person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 
1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States 
district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the 
cost of the suit.‖344  If courts have generally applied Central Bank to civil 
RICO, it makes sense to apply its reasoning to ATA aiding and abetting as 
well.345 
Furthermore, while there is evidence in the ATA‘s legislative history to 
suggest that Congress intended plaintiffs to use the civil provision against 
terrorism financers,346 legislative history can be unreliable and should not 
override hard textual evidence.347  While the ATA‘s more general goals 
might be clear from the legislative history,348 it is far more difficult to 
identify a unified congressional purpose on the more specific issue of 
secondary liability.349  The Gill court illuminated the kinds of 
inconsistencies that can arise from an overzealous reliance on legislative 
history.350  For instance, Joseph Morris‘s testimony in favor of holding 
negligent defendants liable for aiding and abetting acts of terrorism is 
starkly at odds with other evidence, including § 2333(a)‘s explicit treble 
damages provision.351 
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Even evidence suggesting that banks were intended as an ATA target can 
cut the other way—such discussions demonstrate that Congress was aware 
that the ATA did not clearly permit a secondary liability cause of action.352  
Thus, one can presume that confusion surrounding the secondary liability 
issue was apparent to Senator Grassley.353  Congress had the chance to 
explicitly provide for secondary liability in the ATA but chose not to do so.  
Finally, Tel-Oren and Klinghoffer, two of the cases that spawned the ATA, 
were not banking cases.354  In these instances, Congress wanted to give 
plaintiffs an opportunity to obtain civil damages from the actual terrorist 
organizations that funded and supported the attacks.355 
The Wultz court asserted that Bank of China‘s alleged knowledge that it 
was providing financial services to terrorists overcame the benefit of the 
doubt often applied to routine services.356  However, this point alone is not 
enough to rebut the ATA‘s language and permit secondary liability.  The 
routine or nonroutine nature of a bank‘s services to a terrorist group should 
be considered only if the civil provision granted secondary liability in the 
first place.  For the reasons above, the ATA does not appear to provide for a 
secondary liability cause of action. 
2.   Applying the Material Support Law to § 2333(a)  
Creates Inconsistencies 
As discussed in Part II.B, Judge Posner in Boim III proposed using a 
―chain of incorporations‖ theory to hold liable organizations that provide 
financial services to terrorist organizations.357  Plaintiffs have frequently 
invoked this theory to attempt to hold banks primarily liable under the ATA 
when a secondary liability theory has failed.358  If the court considers 
§ 2339B to qualify as an act of international terrorism, it would then apply 
the mental state standard established in Humanitarian Law Project; as a 
result, a defendant would only be required to know that he or she was 
dealing with a terrorist organization and would not be required to 
specifically intend to aid terrorism.359 
At first glance, this solution to the secondary liability issue appears quite 
feasible, but upon further inspection, it raises certain problems.  The trouble 
concerns the clash between the Supreme Court‘s holding in Humanitarian 
Law Project and the text of the current definition of international terrorism.  
This Note argues that courts are often incorrect in applying the material 
support law as a basis for primary liability under the ATA civil provision.  
For the reasons below, the ―chain of incorporations‖ method is not a viable 
alternative to ATA secondary liability for banks. 
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The material support crime does not completely fit the definition of 
international terrorism at § 2333(1).360  The crime could feasibly fulfill 
§ 2331(1)(A); while funding terrorists is not a violent act in itself, courts 
have found that financing terrorism is dangerous.361  The inconsistency 
between the definition and Humanitarian Law Project arises at 
§ 2331(1)(B).  This subsection states that an act of international terrorism 
must also ―appear to be intended‖ to intimidate or coerce civilians, 
influence a government‘s policy by coercion or intimidation, or impact a 
government‘s conduct through assassination, mass destruction, or 
kidnapping.362 
The implications of this failure of the ―chain of incorporations‖ approach 
are significant.  In cases such as Linde v. Arab Bank, where there is 
persuasive evidence that the bank had extensive knowledge of its dealings 
with a terrorist group, this knowledge would not be a sufficient basis for 
primary liability—a plaintiff would need to demonstrate the defendant‘s 
specific intent pursuant to § 2331(1)(B).363  While it is possible that a 
plaintiff could meet this threshold of proof, this standard would frequently 
prove insurmountable.364 
B.   Congress Should Pass Legislation Amending the ATA 
Due to public policy interests in providing an effective civil remedy for 
terrorism victims against banks that knowingly aid terrorists, Congress 
should amend the ATA to provide for aiding and abetting liability for acts 
of international terrorism.  This bill could provide a workable solution to 
the conflict arising from the ATA‘s vague current language. 
Particularly in cases where the actual terrorists are beyond the reach of 
the American judicial system, or where state sponsors of terrorism have 
defaulted, victims of terrorism may have no source of relief without the 
ability to pursue those who conducted business with these parties.365  
Following the Tel-Oren and Klinghoffer cases, the American public became 
keenly aware of terrorism victims‘ limited options for redress.366  The ATA 
was enacted to fix this problem—it is therefore unlikely that Congress 
would be satisfied with the law existing as an empty shell, without any real 
power to bring plaintiffs relief. 
Although Congress‘s intent cannot alter the text of the ATA in hindsight, 
it can inform actions moving forward.  The ATA‘s goals were to provide 
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relief to plaintiffs and to deter terrorism.367  In cases where the bank was 
merely negligent, it is unlikely that the threat of a lawsuit under an ATA 
aiding and abetting liability theory will deter terrorism financing—in fact, 
such a threat could potentially wreak havoc on financial systems as well as 
diplomatic relations.368  On the other hand, in cases where a bank 
persistently conducted business with nations included on the SST list, the 
bank arguably had constructive notice and a stronger nexus exists between 
the bank and the terrorist attack.369  Such a link should not automatically 
result in bank liability; in applying secondary liability under the ATA, 
courts should incorporate the Halberstam standard, based on the 
Restatement, which requires knowledge and substantial assistance.370 
In banking cases, a plaintiff therefore should be required to demonstrate 
that the bank was extremely reckless in its handling of terrorist-linked 
accounts.  For example, continued engagement with businesses within a 
state sponsor of terrorism, such as Iran, could establish such a mental state. 
This careful application of aiding and abetting charges only will be 
possible once Congress takes action to permit secondary liability under the 
ATA.  Congress could arrive at a similar result by altering the ATA‘s 
definition of terrorism so that it better matches the material support law‘s 
knowledge standard, which would render Boim III‘s ―chain of 
incorporations‖ approach more feasible.371  However, as this definition 
serves as the basis for other provisions aside from § 2333(a),372 its text is 
probably best left unaltered.  An amendment to the ATA to permit 
secondary liability, applied as described above, would solve the 
complicated issue of how and when to hold banks liable for acts of 
international terrorism. 
CONCLUSION 
When the assets of a terrorist organization or its state sponsor are 
unreachable, where should plaintiffs turn?  Banks have emerged as an 
attractive target.  For many plaintiffs, suing a bank and pleading under a 
civil aiding and abetting theory may represent the best chance for relief.  
Nevertheless, this Note agrees with the Second and Seventh Circuits that 
the ATA‘s text does not provide for secondary liability in civil suits. 
To end the analysis here, however, would render an incomplete picture of 
the current scope of liability under the ATA.  Courts that do not permit 
secondary liability have often misapplied the material support to terrorism 
law as an alternative to aiding and abetting liability.  Congress should 
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amend the ATA to include secondary liability because the ATA, interpreted 
correctly, does not provide a viable avenue for relief for private plaintiffs in 
cases where banks demonstrate extreme recklessness without clear evidence 
of intent.  However, courts should only permit aiding and abetting claims 
against banks where there is overwhelming evidence that the bank‘s 
involvement went beyond providing routine financial services, either due to 
its extensive interaction with a state sponsor of terrorism or some other red 
flag.  Through applying this strict standard, courts can maintain the delicate 
balance between serving national security interests and protecting legitimate 
financial institutions from unjust persecution. 
